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Fault Injection on Diagnostic Protocols

Niek Timmers


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Big shout out to Ramiro and Santiago!

- Security Analysts at Riscure's *Automotive Security Team*
- Riscure
 - <u>Services</u>
 - E.g. Penetration Testing, Security Architecture Review, and more.
 - <u>Tools</u>
 - E.g. Automotive Security Test Tools, Fault Injection, and more.
 - <u>Training</u>
 - E.g. Embedded Security for Automotive, Fault Injection, and more.
- Offices in the Netherlands, USA and China

Combining services and tools for fun and profit!





Access to the firmware is a tremendous convenience for an attacker!

Obtaining ECU Firmware

- Firmware is available through official channels
- Firmware is stored in an **external memory chip**
- Firmware upgrades are not encrypted
- Firmware is leaked / distributed illegally
- Code protection features are not enabled
- Firmware is extracted using a **software-based attack**

What if all of the above is not applicable? Attackers will resort to something else...

Others came to similar conclusions...



Reference: https://derrekr.github.io/3ds/33c3/#/18

Hackers nowadays use Fault Injection!


Fault Injection – Introduction

"Introducing faults in a target to alter its intended behavior."

```
if( key_is_correct ) <-- Glitch here!
{
    open_door();
}
else
{
    keep_door_closed();
}
...</pre>
```

How can we introduce these faults?


Fault Injection – Techniques




- A controlled environmental change leads to altered behavior in the target
- They leverage a vulnerability in hardware

Fault Injection – Why does it work?

Maximum Frequency vs. V_{CC}





time

Fault Injection – Typical faults

- Instruction corruption
 - Executing different instructions
 - Skipping instructions
- Data corruption
 - Reading different data
 - Writing different data

These faults change the intended behavior of software!

Fault Injection – Tooling

Open source



ChipWhisperer®

Commercial



Fault Injection tooling is available to the masses!

Fault Injection – Examples



Bypassing Secure Boot using Fault Injection

Niek Timmers timmers@riscure.com (@tieknimmers) Albert Spruyt spruyt@riscure.com

November 4, 2016

Fault Injection – Examples



Defeating Secure Boot with EMFI

Ang Cui, PhD & Rick Housley {a|r}@redballoonsecurity.com

Fault Injection – Examples

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KERNELFAULT:

ROOting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault Injection

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We can inject faults and alter software...

What software?

UDS!

It's common and includes convenient functionality!

UDS – **U**nified **D**iagnostic **S**ervices

- Diagnostic and Communication Management
 - Diagnostic Session Control
 - Security Access
- Data Transmission
 - Read and Write memory
- Upload / Download
 - Read and Program flash
- Manufacturer proprietary



Disclaimer: Manufacturers are free to implement only a subset of the UDS specification!


UDS – What speaks it?

Most ECUs in a modern car speak it
using a multitude of protocolsCANK-LineFlexRayEthernet


It is unlikely UDS will go away!

UDS – Typical use case

Firmware update



Standard Security Access Check



The secret used by the key calculation algorithm should be protected!

Standard Security Access Check


```
int key verification(. . .) {
    // key verificati 🏹
    if ( received_key is calculated_key ) {
        access granted()
        error code = NONE;
    } else {
        error code = INVALID KEY;
    return error code;
```

Standard Security Access Check

- Not successful :'(
- There's a 10 minute timeout after 3 failed attempts
- Simply not practical for us (or an attacker)


Some times you have to take your losses and move on!

Reading Memory



No restrictions on failed attempts!

Reading Memory



Reading Memory

- Successful on multiple instrument clusters
- Depending on the target
 - Allows reading out **N** bytes from an **arbitrary** address
 - Extraction of the internal memories in **N** days
- Addresses include volatile and non-volatile memories
 - Complete firmware extracted

Extraction of the firmware only has to be done once!

We have the firmware... now what?

Lots of "cool" stuff...

- Reverse engineering
 - Understanding the device
 - Extracting secrets
- Finding vulnerabilities

Please see <u>Alyssa's</u> presentation on reverse engineering firmware efficiently!


But... does this scale !?

Hardware attacks scale!

- Firmware can be distributed
- Secrets can be distributed
- Vulnerabilities (and exploits) can be distributed
- Vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely

Reading memory is fun! What about something cooler?

Attack #3: Writing memory



Where should we write to get code execution on the ECU?

Wrapping up...

Why is UDS vulnerable?

- A robust Security Access check is not part of the standard
- Typical Security Access check based on pre-shared secrets
- No fault injection resistant hardware used in most ECUs
- No fault injection resistant software used in most ECUs

What can you do?

Improving Products

- Include fault injection attacks in your threat model
- Design and implement fault injection resistant hardware
 - Start from an early design
 - Test, test... and test again!
- Implement fault injection resistant software
- Make critical assets inaccessible to software
 - E.g. Using "real" hardware

Fault Injection Hardened Firmware

Not hardened

if (authenticated) {
 error_code = NONE;
 something_useful();

Hardened

if (authenticated) {
 error_code = NONE;
} else { return }
if (authenticated) {
 something useful();

else { return }

Prevent single point of failures for security critical checks! More info here.

Key takeaways

- Fault injection attacks are available to the masses
- Fault injection attacks subvert software security models
- All unprotected devices are vulnerable
- Presented attack not unique; most ECUs affected
- Fault injection attacks result in scalable attacks

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Thank you!

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Challenge your security

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